In this exclusive interview for Andrei Eugen Drăguț, Constantin Pintilie explores the concrete foundations of technological autonomy. He addresses an attack not only on our physical infrastructure, but on the very capacity of a nation to act independently in an age of hybrid threats.

Constantin Pintilie is a Romanian engineer and entrepreneur, founder and CEO of BlueSpace Technology. His company is recognized as the only one in Eastern Europe producing TEMPEST equipment — advanced technology for protecting data against information leakage — officially accredited by both NATO and the European Union.

A graduate of the Politehnica University of Bucharest, Pintilie established BlueSpace Technology in 2016. He is a vocal advocate for the reindustrialization of Romania and for genuine domestic production, consistently emphasizing the strategic importance of developing local defense and cybersecurity technologies.

This conversation goes far beyond a corporate presentation. It addresses fundamental questions: Can a state claim genuine political autonomy while remaining almost entirely dependent on foreign suppliers for its critical technologies? What is the real difference between technological autonomy and the comfortable illusion of independence? How can education, private initiative, and public policy align to create a coherent ecosystem of national resilience?

The dialogue offers both a lucid diagnosis of Romania’s vulnerabilities — technical, institutional, and psychological — and a pragmatic model of what concrete action looks like. Grounded in real achievements — NATO accredited testing, accredited laboratories, and international contracts — it avoids both naive optimism and defeatist cynicism, revealing instead the difficult but necessary path toward genuine strategic autonomy.

Physical protection tempest and invisible vulnerabilities

In this first part of the interview, Constantin Pintilie reveals the hidden battlefield of electromagnetic emissions. He explains how TEMPEST technology protects sensitive information from invisible leaks that most people never even consider.

• For a non-specialist reader, what is TEMPEST technology and why does it matter in modern security?

I’ll explain it without using technical jargon. Every electronic device—a computer, a radio station, a monitor—constructively emits electromagnetic waves. This phenomenon cannot be avoided; it is simply how any electrically powered equipment works. As for the systems that process data—whether digital information, voice, or video—that information is embedded into the emitted electromagnetic waves. While using specialized equipment, someone at a distance can intercept these electromagnetic emissions and extract the embedded in information, reconstructing, for example, what is displayed on a screen or what is being transmitted as voice, even when the data itself is encrypted.

TEMPEST is the standard that defines the technological solutions designed to address precisely this vulnerability. TEMPEST is, in fact, a code name rather than an acronym; it refers, as I mentioned, to protecting information systems against unintentional electromagnetic emissions. Today, the term is used generically within NATO and across the industry to refer to the standards and certifications that protect against these emissions, such as the SDIP-27 series of standards.

As a TEMPEST equipment manufacturer, we design, shield, and test both equipment and facilities so that these emissions can no longer be intercepted. In this way, information is protected at its source, before encryption is even applied—at the point where encryption alone is no longer sufficient. In a command centre, a ministry, or aboard a military vessel – this is the difference between communications that are truly secure and communications that have been compromised without anyone even realizing it.

Over the past ten years, we are proud to say that BlueSpace Technology has become the regional leader in this market. We provide TEMPEST products and services not only in Romania but also internationally, including in Türkiye, Hungary, Finland, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, and we are one of the core suppliers to NATO procurement agencies. In the field of TEMPEST services, BlueSpace Technology has developed the largest network of nationally, NATO-, and EU-certified laboratories owned by a private company in this region. We provide TEMPEST equipment testing and certification services using state-of-the-art laboratories, both fixed and mobile.

Among the approximately 40 NATO-accredited TEMPEST manufacturers worldwide, BlueSpace Technology has repeatedly won competitive procurement procedures organized by NATO’s specialized structures and agencies, demonstrating that Romanian expertise can compete and perform at the highest international level.

• What technologies and capabilities is BlueSpace Technology currently developing, and how do they fit into the broader security needs of Romania and Europe?

We do not start by asking, “What product is high demand today?” Instead, we begin with a much more fundamental question: how do we protect a nation’s ability to make its own decisions and defend its infrastructure when an adversary targets the electromagnetic spectrum and information itself? Everything we do is built around that question.

Our goal is to develop not just products, but capabilities. In other words, we aim to build technological competencies by continuously refining our engineering solutions, integrating the results of our own research and development with equipment and subsystems acquired through industrial partnerships or technology transfers from other collaborators. That is how we have developed our entire portfolio—counter-drone systems, including OKYA 5601 and our AI-powered interceptor drone, secure communications, TEMPEST technologies, and electronic warfare capabilities.

With the same vision, we designed Romania’s first armoured fighting vehicle, VLAH, which we see as a versatile platform capable of integrating all of these defensive solutions. Together, these capabilities address the same pressing need facing Romania and the entire eastern flank of Europe: low-cost, autonomous, and difficult-to-detect threats. The war in our immediate neighbourhood has shown that a drone costing only thousands of euros can inflict damage worth millions. Our role is to provide the Romanian Government with solutions to this type of threat—solutions that are designed and manufactured here, rather than purchased off the shelf from abroad at a high cost.

Our objective is to reverse this equation: to counter drones worth tens of thousands of euros with equipment that costs only a few hundred.

Moving beyond the protection of individual devices, the conversation shifts toward a broader vision — how isolated technical solutions can evolve into integrated strategic capabilities.

From products to capabilities BlueSpace Technology development strategy

Constantin Pintilie describes the journey of BlueSpace Technology from developing individual products to building complete capability systems. He outlines the strategic thinking behind creating solutions that meet the highest international standards.

• What do people misunderstand about technological security when they reduce it only to software, hackers, or stolen data?

The most common misconception is that technological security is simply about passwords, antivirus software, and preventing someone from stealing your data. While that is certainly part of it, it is only the tip of the iceberg. Behind every information system there is physical hardware, cabling, sensors, supply chains, and people—and each of these can be attacked, intercepted, or exploited for intelligence purposes. Usually, the least expensive path for an adversary is not to break sophisticated encryption, but to exploit a physical component or take advantage of human error.

There is also another, often underestimated, dimension: security is not only about confidentiality, but also about availability. If a drone disables an airport or a refinery, no information has been stolen, yet the damage can be enormous. Real security means thinking about the entire chain—from the chip inside a device all the way to the human decision-making at the highest level.

• How do secure hardware, cybersecurity, electronic warfare, AI, and signal protection converge in the new security environment?

The most significant change in recent years is that threats no longer emerge in isolation or within distinct domains. A modern attack is hybrid by nature: a drone carrying out a physical strike, accompanied by electronic jamming that blinds your sensors, a cyberattack targeting command systems, and, in parallel, a disinformation campaign designed to create confusion among the population. If you defend each domain separately, you lose—because the adversary combines them. That is why the defence must be just as integrated as the attack.

An integrated C-UAS system, such as OKYA 5601 developed by our experts, does exactly that. It combines sensor-based detection, artificial intelligence-driven analysis, and command-and-control decision-making into a single operational workflow. In the field of counter-drone capabilities—C-UAS being the most widely used acronym—we have built our approach on the understanding that, although the importance of electronic warfare alone will gradually diminish as attack drones become increasingly resistant to electronic countermeasures, the ability to disrupt the electromagnetic spectrum in which hostile drones operate will remain relevant. However, it must be complemented by the integration of artificial intelligence into the command-and-control chain, covering detection, classification, and engagement through kinetic effectors.

At the core of our system is artificial intelligence. It is designed to respond in the shortest possible time—well beyond the natural limitations of human operators. It can detect and track dozens of targets simultaneously, calculate their future trajectories, and deploy interceptor drones to neutralize the attack while minimizing risks to civilian communities and critical infrastructure on the ground.

To answer to your question, secure hardware, cybersecurity, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence are no longer adjacent disciplines—they are different facets of the same reality. Anyone who approaches them separately risks building a vulnerable defence.

Technological autonomy versus strategic dependence

Here the discussion turns to one of the most critical issues of our time: the tension between technological autonomy and strategic dependence. Pintilie offers a clear-eyed analysis of the risks a nation faces when it relies heavily on foreign technology for its security needs.

• Can a country be politically autonomous if its critical technologies, secure communications, and strategic infrastructure are almost entirely imported?

The short answer is no—not entirely. But I want to make an important distinction, because I am not advocating isolation. There is no country in the world, not even the largest ones, that produces absolutely everything on its own, and interdependence among allies is both healthy and desirable. The problem arises when dependence becomes absolute in the critical layers—communications, strategic infrastructure, and defense systems. At that point, part of your sovereignty quietly shifts into the hands of the supplier: they decide when spare parts are delivered, when updates are provided, and under what contractual conditions. In a crisis, precisely when you need them most, you may find that you are no longer the one making the decisions.

That is why technological autonomy does not mean doing everything on your own. It means maintaining control over the critical layers without which you cannot function, while having the ability to maintain, modify, and adapt the systems you rely on independently.

• How can Romania pursue technological autonomy without turning it into another form of collective self-deception? What separates real strategic capability from the comforting story that we are finally becoming autonomous?

This is perhaps the most important question you could ask me, and I am glad you did. There is only one thing that separates genuine capability from a comforting narrative: evidence.

Real capability is not demonstrated in high-quality brochures, polished PowerPoint presentations, sophisticated websites, or professionally produced promotional videos, although many claim to offer cutting-edge solutions through them. Real capability is proven on the test range, validated through independent certification, delivered to demanding customers, and, ideally, exported—because exporting means that someone with no emotional reason to believe in you has been convinced by the evidence.

Self-deception, on the other hand, lives in those presentations, press releases, and conferences. I am careful to avoid that trap myself. When we say, “Because it is possible in Romania®,” we do not present it as a slogan. We back it up by showing, for example, a counter-drone system tested during a NATO exercise at Capu Midia, a fully operational TEMPEST laboratory, or an armoured fighting vehicle designed from the ground up and manufactured here. These are tangible results.

The danger of collective self-deception is that it makes you stop working because you become satisfied with the narrative. The antidote is simple, even if it is uncomfortable: always demand evidence—including from yourself.

• What does technological autonomy mean in practice: independence, interoperability, control over critical layers, or something else?

In practice, technological autonomy has several layers, and it is important to understand each of them. The first is independence: the ability to continue operating even if, tomorrow, your external supplier disappears. The second is interoperability: you must be able to integrate seamlessly with your allies within NATO and the European Union—an autonomy that isolates you from your allies is an autonomy without value.

The third, and most important, is control over the critical layers: knowing what is inside your systems, having access to their architecture, and ensuring there are no “black boxes” that you do not understand. The fourth is technological resilience: the ability to maintain, upgrade, and adapt your systems independently. These last two are what truly define meaningful autonomy.

We do not need to manufacture every single screw domestically. What matters is controlling and being able to sustain the capabilities that are vital. In fact, in answering your question, I believe I have just invented an acronym: IICR—Independence, Interoperability, Control, and Resilience. Perhaps we will hear more about it in the future. It would be interesting to see it adopted in the public statements of government officials.

Yet achieving technological autonomy faces significant obstacles. The conversation now moves into the real barriers that stand in the way.

The real barriers to autonomy institutional psychological educational

Constantin Pintilie speaks openly about the deeper, often invisible barriers to autonomy — not only institutional inertia, but also psychological patterns and educational shortcomings that hinder Romania’s technological development.

• What belief about Romania’s technological future should we abandon, and what belief should we build instead?

We should let go of the belief that we are too small or too poor to develop strategic technologies—that our role is merely to sit at the end of the value chain, serving as a market for imported products and a source of low-cost labour. We should also abandon the idea that assembling technological “kits” designed and manufactured by others somehow amounts to meaningful industrial cooperation. That belief has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Simply importing advanced systems will not solve our medium- or long-term challenges. Nor will limiting our industrial ambitions to the local assembly of products. Once the assembly of the manufacturer’s kits comes to an end, what remains is a factory building and a workforce whose skills are largely limited to assembling components.

Rather than embracing that mindset, I would advocate one that is both realistic and inspiring: the belief that we can become a trusted niche supplier within the allied industrial base, recognized for our competence rather than accommodated out of courtesy. We do not need to be the biggest—we need to be exceptionally good at a few things that truly matter. Everything we do at BlueSpace Technology is built on that conviction, which we have even registered as our slogan: “Because it it can be done in Romania too!®”. It is not mere rhetoric, it s a commitment to proving, day after day, that it is, indeed possible.

• From your perspective, is Romania’s main technological vulnerability technical, institutional, educational, or psychological?

Perhaps surprisingly, my answer would be that the technical vulnerability is actually the easiest one to address. We have outstanding engineers, strong technical universities, and people who, when given the opportunity, are capable of building solutions that meet world-class standards. In recent years, demand for internships at BlueSpace Technology among Polytechnic University students has been surprisingly high.

We receive dozens of applications for every available position. Each year, we select the very best candidates, and we are genuinely impressed by both their talent and their ideas. So, when it comes to the human capital we will rely on in the future, we are in a very strong position.

The other two vulnerabilities are far more challenging. The institutional one is a matter of continuity: a strategic project requires stable funding and consistent direction over ten years, not just a single budget cycle. The psychological one is, in my point of view, the deepest of all—the lack of confidence in products made in Romania. We have become experts at assuming that if something is Romanian, it must be inferior to what comes from abroad. I have often referred to this by saying that we only want products from well-known brands, without asking whether we ourselves are a brand worth trusting. I do not say this as a criticism, but as a reality we encounter repeatedly.

• How would you evaluate the current level of technological competence among public decision-makers, institutions, and private actors in Romania?

I would avoid assigning grades, because that would be neither fair nor constructive. I prefer to look at the issue from a systemic perspective. We certainly have competent, dedicated decision-makers who are genuinely committed to solving problems. The real issue, however, is not solely about people—it is also about the mechanism. We lack a stable channel through which technical expertise consistently reaches the decision-making table early enough to make a difference.

Too often, decisions on the procurement of complex technologies are made without the right technical expert being in the room at the right time. This cannot be solved simply by replacing individuals; it requires building the right structures—technical advisory councils, independent evaluations, and decision-making procedures in which the engineer’s voice carries as much weight as that of the end user.

The private sector can make a valuable contribution by providing expertise, but the final decision and the corresponding responsibility must, quite rightly, remain with public institutions. I say all this in a spirit of collaboration, not criticism.

• What should public institutions understand better when they make decisions about technology, procurement, cybersecurity, and strategic infrastructure?

The most important thing I would like public institutions to internalize when planning procurement is that the lowest price on paper can often become the highest cost over time. A system that is inexpensive to acquire, but ties you to a single supplier for maintenance, comes without technology transfer, and cannot be independently adapted to the real operational needs of its end users—the military personnel who must rely on it to defend the country—will ultimately cost far more over its lifetime, not only in financial terms but, more importantly, in strategic dependence on the supplier.

That is why procurement decisions should be based on total life-cycle cost and, just as importantly, on the value that remains in the country: jobs, technical expertise, and maintenance capabilities. A good procurement decision is not necessarily the one that delivers the lowest price today—it is the one that leaves Romania more capable tomorrow.

Despite these challenges, the path forward exists. The final part of the interview focuses on practical ways to build lasting resilience.

Building a national ecosystem of resilience

In this concluding section, Pintilie explores what it would take to construct a genuine national ecosystem of resilience — one that connects private initiative, education, and long-term public policy in a coherent strategy for the future.

• Building strategic technology in Romania requires more than engineering. What cultural, organizational, and psychological barriers had to be overcome?

To be honest, for our company, the engineering side of the challenge was, as I have already mentioned, the least difficult. When you have passion and the necessary technical expertise, there is always a solution. The greatest barriers were matters of mindset. Internally, we had to build a culture in which people believed they could develop original products, not simply integrate off-the-shelf solutions from abroad. That represents a fundamental difference in both ambition and ownership. Externally, we had to overcome the understandable skepticism of institutional customers who, for many years, had been conditioned to believe that anything truly “serious” had to come from large foreign manufacturers

Changing that perception does not happen through speeches—it happens by putting the product on the table and saying: “Test it.” The most difficult, but also the most rewarding, moment is when someone who was initially skeptical sees the system perform and changes their mind. That is the real victory.

That is exactly what we did with our SILENTA family of portable counter-drone jamming systems. We provided the system to a military organization and challenged them to test it against the most advanced drones in their inventory. At first, they were skeptical and started with their less capable platforms. But as they saw us successfully neutralize every one of them, they brought out their most advanced systems and ultimately concluded that we were offering a solution that matched—and in some respects exceeded—the performance of comparable foreign-made equipment they had previously evaluated.

That day was a source of immense satisfaction for our entire team. Today, SILENTA is a mature, operational system in active service with the Romanian Armed Forces. More recently, we delivered a major upgrade at no additional cost to the customer. That is what it means to have a product developed in Romania: direct access to the developer, the ability to adapt quickly to evolving operational requirements, and value that remains within the national economy—not just on paper, but in practice.

• What kind of education system does Romania need if it wants to produce not only users of technology, but builders of strategic technology?

We need an education system that produces creators of technology, not just highly skilled users of technology. Today, our engineering education generally produces graduates who know how to use tools developed by others exceptionally well. That is valuable, but it is not enough for a country that aspires to develop its own strategic capabilities

Developing technology creators requires far more hands-on experience—real laboratories rather than just classrooms and theory—and concrete projects carried out in partnership with industry from the very beginning of university, so that young engineers are exposed to real-world challenges before they graduate.

At BlueSpace Technology, we regularly welcome engineering students for internships, as i mentioned earlier. They arrive with an excellent theoretical foundation, but often with limited exposure to industrial reality. We see how enthusiastic they become when we take them seriously and involve them in real engineering projects. We provide them with everything they need—state-of-the-art test equipment, advanced instruments, components of every kind—and encourage them to build something tangible. To design a circuit, solder the components onto the board, test it, and, if it does not work, start over until it does. That is how engineers are made.

If I could change just one thing, it would be this: bring the industry into education, and the education into industry—early, consistently, and systematically.

• How important are investment in research, applied science, laboratories, engineering schools, and university-industry partnerships for national resilience?

They are essential—and I would argue that this is where long-term national resilience is ultimately determined. A research institute isolated from the market produces valuable ideas that too often remain on the shelf. An industry without research quickly reaches a plateau. Real strength emerges where the two come together.

Over the years, we have built strong and lasting partnerships with the academic community. Most recently, we equipped a drone engineering laboratory at the Polytechnic University of Bucharest with state-of-the-art equipment and the latest software, and we fully fund its operation through the BlueSpace Drones Engineering Lab.

We have taken the same approach at the Elena Cuza National College in Bucharest, where we fully support the BlueSpace Robotics laboratory with the resources it needs to operate. At the end of 2025, we also established our own research institute—BlueSpace Research—which will serve as the spearhead of our innovation activities

These initiatives have shown us firsthand how valuable these partnerships truly are. Students gain hands-on experience by working on real projects, we benefit from fresh talent and new ideas, and research is given a clear practical purpose. For a country with limited resources such as Romania, these partnerships are not a luxury—they are the most effective way to transform the abundance of intelligence and talent we possess into real technological capability.

• What skills should citizens develop in order to become less vulnerable in a digital and hybrid-threat environment?

I would say all of them—but in a particular order. At the foundation are critical thinking and digital literacy: the ability to navigate the digital world effectively without accepting everything at face value. On top of those, I would add something that receives far too little attention: epistemic discipline. In other words, not just asking, “What do I know?” but also, “How do I know it? How confident am I? And how can I verify it?

In an environment where disinformation is inexpensive to produce and abundant, a resilient citizen is not someone who claims to have an answer to every question, but someone who is willing to question their own assumptions and seek evidence. Technology can help us, but it cannot relieve us of this responsibility for intellectual discipline. The resilience of a society begins in the mind of each individual.

When it comes to education, it is not enough simply to speak about its importance—we must actively contribute to its development. There is an old saying that states: a person leaves a lasting mark on the world by having a child, planting a tree, and building a house. All three matter. What is important is not the order in which you accomplish them, but how wisely you manage your resources so that, over time, you achieve them all.

• What would a serious national strategy for technological competence look like, from school to university, from research to industry, from citizen to decision-maker?

It would certainly take the form of an unbroken chain: school, university, research, industry, and decision-makers—where each link supports the next, without gaps or disconnects. The unfortunate reality is that Romania once had such a system, at least in the defense industry before 1990. As imperfect as that period was—and I am certainly not nostalgic for those times—the defense industry functioned as an integrated ecosystem. It had robust manufacturing capabilities that delivered the solutions the armed forces required, built on Romanian research and development and supported by a technical education system, both vocational and university-level, designed to produce the skilled workforce needed to sustain this strategic industrial sector.

Today, we still have strong individual links, but they remain disconnected from one another. A serious national strategy would reconnect them and, above all, provide what we have chronically lacked: continuity and multi-year funding. The greatest enemy of strategic competence is not a lack of talent—it is discontinuity. A strategy that changes with every political cycle is not really a strategy at all; it is merely a succession of abandoned beginnings.

If I had to summarize it in a single sentence, it would be this: fewer grand strategy documents and more institutional patience to see long-term plans through, across successive governments.

• How can education and technology raise the standard of living in Romania in a concrete way, not only through slogans about innovation?

I would move away from the empty rhetoric surrounding “innovation” and speak in much more concrete terms. Romania does not lack people with brilliant ideas. What we lack is a vision that gives more people the opportunity to turn those ideas into reality. I believe this also explains why entrepreneurs with a proven track record tend to be sceptical of those who arrive with polished presentations describing what they intend to build and how outstanding their solutions will be. In Romania, transforming an idea into a real product remains, unfortunately, a journey that private companies in the defence and security technology sector must undertake largely at their own risk.

Political decision-makers should understand that when a strategic product is designed and manufactured in Romania, the entire value chain remains here: engineers are employed here, suppliers are local, taxes are paid into our national budget, and expertise accumulates within the country. The result is straightforward: better-paid highly skilled professionals, Romanian companies that grow around these capabilities, and an economy that moves up the value chain instead of remaining focused on low-value assembly work.

Education and technology do not raise living standards by magic. They do so through a simple economic mechanism: you develop sophisticated, high-value products that people are willing to buy, and the economic value stays within the community. A single well-designed niche product can support dozens of families of engineers.

• What types of jobs, industries, and local capabilities could Romania build if it invested consistently in education, research, and advanced technology?

I believe we need to be both realistic and ambitious at the same time. We are not going to become “the next Silicon Valley”—nor should that be our ambition. But we can become a trusted niche supplier within the allied industrial base, specializing in highly specific fields such as sensors, onboard artificial intelligence vision systems, secure communications, counter-drone systems, and highly specialized components. These are areas where intelligence and precision matter far more than vast amounts of capital—and that is exactly where our strengths lie.

With sustained investment in education, research, and advanced technology, we could build industries that produce products in demand across Europe and create the kind of high-value jobs that would give our young people compelling reasons to build their careers here rather than abroad. That is what is truly at stake.

• What is the cost of underinvesting in education and research when a country enters an era of AI, cyber conflict, and electronic warfare?

The cost is enormous, but also deceptive, because it is not immediately visible. Defense technology is not something you acquire once a crisis begins—it is something you develop years in advance, so that the necessary capabilities are already in place when pressure mounts. Once a crisis erupts, it is too late to start educating engineers or developing new systems. At that point, you are forced to buy in haste—most likely at a high price, from whoever is willing to sell, and on their terms. Those who fail to invest in education and research at the right time ultimately pay many times over—in money, in lost time, and, most importantly, in dependence.

In the era of artificial intelligence, cyber conflict, and electronic warfare, technological gaps widen exponentially. Every year of underinvestment leaves you further behind and makes catching up increasingly difficult. The apparent savings achieved by underfunding education and research, and by neglecting the urgent need to connect them with the real economy, are ultimately paid back through costly purchases of technologies developed by others—countries and companies with the foresight to invest consistently and avoid the mistakes we made.

• How can the private sector contribute to national resilience without waiting passively for the state to define every priority?

The private sector operating in defence and security technology should not sit back and wait for the state to tell it exactly what to do. We believe in initiative. We developed the VLAH armoured fighting vehicle, the OKYA counter-drone system, the SILENTA family of portable drone jamming systems, and even our TEMPEST manufacturing and laboratory ecosystem at our own risk, investing private capital—our own resources—before anyone asked us to do so. We did this so that we could approach the state with solutions that were already developed, tested, and ready for deployment, rather than with promises. In my view, this is the healthiest role the private sector can play: anticipating future needs, assuming part of the risk of research and development, and providing the state with real, proven options.

At the same time, we should not expect the private sector to carry this burden alone. It is entirely appropriate for the state to define the nation’s strategic priorities, but it must also decide how those priorities will be supported with the country’s economic resources. There is a fundamental difference between passively waiting for a contract and proactively developing solutions. Likewise, there is a fundamental difference between setting ambitious strategic objectives and failing to back them with the necessary financial commitment. National resilience is strengthened enormously when the private sector acts as an active partner rather than a mere contractor, and when the state moves beyond the mindset of a customer to embrace its role as an engaged strategic stakeholder.

• If you could recommend one concrete measure that Romania should adopt in the next five years to strengthen technological autonomy, what would it be?

If I were to recommend just one measure, it would be the introduction of a predictable, multi-year funding mechanism for defence research and development—one that is not subject to annual budget cycles or political changes. Because, as I have said before, our greatest enemy is not a lack of talent, but a lack of continuity.

Almost equally important would be a serious offset policy. Whenever the state procures technology from abroad—and there are times when that is entirely appropriate—it should require, in return, technology transfer and local production in Romania. In that way, every foreign procurement would leave behind lasting domestic expertise rather than simply becoming another expenditure.

Together, these two measures would transform the Romanian defence industry within just a few years.

• What kind of “strategic mind” does a resilient nation need in the 21st century, and what could Romania realistically contribute?

I believe a resilient nation needs a “strategic mind”—one defined by the ability to think in the long term, beyond immediate priorities and electoral cycles. It is the ability to launch today the kinds of projects whose benefits will be realized by others ten or fifteen years from now, while having the maturity to sustain them rather than abandon them with the first change of government.

There is another essential element as well: recognizing that sovereignty is not proclaimed in speeches—it is built, brick by brick, through engineering, in laboratories, factories, and classrooms. Romania has something in abundance that it too often fails to capitalize on: intelligence and creativity in the face of constraints. We are a people with an extraordinary capacity for resourcefulness. The challenge is to transform that resourcefulness into systematic and enduring capability.

• Looking ten or fifteen years ahead, what technological capability would you most want Romania to have developed by then, and what must begin now for that future to become real?

Looking fifteen years ahead, I would like Romania to have developed and manufactured here a complete chain of counter-drone defense and AI-powered vision capabilities—from sensors and algorithms all the way to integrated command-and-control systems. In other words, rather than importing protection against one of the defining threats of this century, we should be the ones providing it, including to our allies.

For that future to become reality, the work must begin now—not ten years from now. It starts with investing in people, building partnerships with universities, ensuring continuity of funding, and fostering institutional confidence in the domestic defense industry.

The technologies we are developing today at BlueSpace Technology—the OKYA C-UAS system, our AI-powered interceptor, the VLAH armored fighting vehicle, and our international partnerships that bring know-how to Romania—are all steps along that path. The rest depends on patience, consistency, and the courage to believe that it can be done. The more people embrace that mindset, the better.