Exclusive Interview with Loredana Terec-Vlad: Redesigning humanity through transhumanism, neurorights and the ethics of human enhancement
For most of human history, the fundamental limitations of human existence were conditions to be understood, endured, challenged and, occasionally, overcome. Humanity could reshape its environment and extend the boundaries of its capabilities, but it possessed relatively little control over the biological foundations of its own existence.
That relationship is undergoing a profound transformation.
Advances in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, neuroscience, genetic engineering and reproductive technologies are turning what were once considered the inherent limits of human nature into potential objects of technological intervention. The human body, mind, identity and even the prospect of mortality are increasingly entering the domain of technological design.

Yet the ability to transform human nature raises a question that technological progress cannot answer on its own: Who has the authority to decide what humanity should become?
Transhumanism presents itself as an extension of humanity’s enduring aspiration to transcend its limitations. At the same time, its promises revive some of modernity’s most powerful narratives: the inevitability of progress, the supremacy of reason, the ideal of the Übermensch and the possibility of overcoming mortality.
But what happens when these aspirations become commercial products, institutional agendas or instruments of social competition? Can human enhancement genuinely expand individual autonomy while creating new forms of dependency, inequality and control? And where should we draw the boundary between the legitimate pursuit of human improvement and the technological redesign of human existence?
In this exclusive interview, Andrei Eugen Drăguț speaks with Loredana Terec-Vlad, philosopher and legal scholar whose work explores transhumanism, bioethics, neurorights and the legal implications of emerging technologies. Together, they examine the philosophical assumptions, ethical dilemmas and institutional consequences underlying the technological transformation of humanity.
Holding a PhD in Philosophy from Ștefan cel Mare University of Suceava, awarded magna cum laude in 2019, Loredana Terec-Vlad devoted her doctoral research to the relationship between transhumanism and the myths of modernity, under the title Transhumanism as Neo-Humanism: Recontextualising the Myths of Modernity. Her interdisciplinary academic background encompasses law, political science and philosophy, providing a framework for examining technological progress not merely as a scientific or economic phenomenon, but as a transformation of human identity, social structures and normative principles.
Her publications include Humanism, Transhumanism, Posthumanism: Philosophical Perspectives and Myths, Archetypes and Symbols in Transhumanism, works that examine the philosophical narratives underlying humanity’s aspiration to transcend its biological limitations. Her research also addresses bioethics, the ethics of care, artificial intelligence, organizational ethics and the evolving relationship between technological innovation and fundamental human rights.
More recently, her academic work has extended into the emerging field of neuro-rights and cognitive protection, examining the legal and ethical implications of neural technologies, mental privacy and the protection of human cognitive autonomy. Her broader research interests also encompass reproductive technologies, the legal implications of surrogacy and the changing foundations of family, identity and human relationships.
This combination of philosophical inquiry, legal analysis and ethical research makes her perspective particularly relevant to a discussion that seeks to move beyond technological optimism and pessimism towards a deeper examination of the principles that should govern the future of humanity.
The conversation moves beyond the conventional debate over the benefits and risks of technological innovation. It explores the myth of progress, the secularisation of transcendence, the commercialisation of immortality, mental privacy, cognitive freedom, genetic intervention, reproductive technologies and the future of personal identity. It also examines whether technological enhancement could produce new hierarchies between augmented and non-augmented individuals, while challenging established ideas of autonomy, dignity and human vulnerability.
At its core, this conversation addresses a fundamental distinction: the difference between possessing the technological power to transcend human limitations and having the philosophical wisdom, ethical legitimacy and moral responsibility to decide which limitations should be transcended.
The question, ultimately, is not simply what technology will allow us to become, but who will shape that future, according to whose values, and at what cost.
The myths and ideological foundations of transhumanism
This opening section examines the intellectual foundations of transhumanism, tracing its relationship with modern ideas of progress, human self-transcendence, and the historical use of transformative ideals. It explores how philosophical aspirations can acquire ideological dimensions and how concepts of human improvement may intersect with questions of power and control.
- Your doctoral thesis reframed transhumanism as a form of neo-humanism, recontextualizing older modern myths. What is the founding myth transhumanism keeps recycling, and why do we seem to need one?
I believe the founding myth is that of progress. In my thesis, I traced it alongside the myths of the Übermensch and reason, but the more I worked on this subject, the clearer it became to me that the other two rest upon it. The Übermensch is the point towards which progress strives. Reason is the means through which it is achieved. What transhumanism does is not invent a new myth, but take an old one to its logical conclusion. Modernity spoke of progress as a road with a direction. Transhumanism speaks of a road without an end. Every limitation of the body or mind becomes a temporary technical problem, and every improvement achieved is merely preparation for the next one.
Why do we need such a myth? Because human beings cannot live without a horizon of meaning. Eliade showed that myths do not disappear in a secularized world; they merely conceal themselves in other forms. When religious transcendence loses its force, its place is taken by other narratives that promise to overcome the human condition. I have called this function transreligiosity. It is a form of sacredness without a church, in which salvation comes through technology. I do not consider the existence of the myth to be the problem, since all societies have needed legitimizing narratives. The problem begins when we forget that we are dealing with a myth and present it as a scientific forecast.
- You’ve drawn a direct intellectual line from Nietzsche’s Übermensch to transhumanism, describing “soft slavery” as an alternative to classical slavery. Can you walk through, step by step, where exactly the idea of self-transcendence turns into a form of control?
For me, this trajectory has four stages, and the decisive shift occurs only in the last one. For Nietzsche, the Übermensch is not a product, but a task. Every person is called upon to overcome themselves and create their own values. This effort cannot be delegated, and no one can make you an Übermensch from the outside. The second stage is the ideological hijacking of the twentieth century, which I analyzed when I wrote about the transition from nationalism to totalitarianism. Nazism transformed the idea into a racial program, while communism turned it into the project of the New Man. Self-overcoming was no longer a personal matter. The state decided who had to become the human being of the future and who had to be eliminated from that future. The third stage is the transhumanist one. On the surface, the discourse returns to the individual and their freedom to choose. Everyone could decide whether they wanted to be augmented; however, the tools of augmentation do not belong to the individual. They are created, funded, and controlled by companies and laboratories. The fourth stage emerges when the intervention takes place before the person is able to consent. I am thinking especially of the genetic editing of embryos. In this case, someone else decides in advance what the future person will be like. I have called this situation “soft slavery”. It is not slavery imposed through chains or force, but one inscribed in the biological or cognitive constitution of the human being. The conditioned person does not even perceive the subordination, because they have been shaped to accept it as normal. Therefore, transcendence becomes control when its author is replaced by its designer.
- Your research has examined the cultural mechanisms behind extremist ideologies. What is the most painful illusion you had to give up about human nature itself while studying them, and does it resurface when you look at today’s enthusiasm for AI and enhancement?
The illusion I lost was the belief that education protects us from extremist ideologies. When I studied the history of totalitarian regimes, I saw that their supporters included highly educated people: doctors, lawyers, professors, and engineers. It was not a lack of culture that led them to embrace these ideologies. Ideology offered them a place within a community, a sense of meaning, and the promise of a new beginning. These are profound human needs, and ideologies know how to exploit them. I recognize this mechanism in today’s enthusiasm for artificial intelligence and augmentation as well. We are told about a radical break with the past, about an elite that can see the future, and about a majority that must adapt. The difference is that today the promise no longer comes from the state, but from the market. That is precisely why it is harder to identify and challenge.
Neurorights, AI and individual responsibility
This section turns to the ethical and legal implications of increasingly intimate technological interactions. It considers the protection of mental privacy, the conditions under which consent remains meaningful, and the responsibilities individuals retain when using AI systems and sharing information through them.
- As someone working on neurorights, what is the first neurological right current legislation still fails to protect, and what concretely happens if we don’t regulate it in time?
I would say that the right to mental privacy is the least protected at this point. The specialist literature discusses several neurorights, such as cognitive liberty, mental integrity, and psychological continuity. Mental privacy, however, seems to me to be the most exposed, because the technologies that can affect it are already on the market. Data protection legislation protects us relatively well when it comes to the information we provide. It protects us far less effectively against what can be inferred about us, because neural or physiological signals can be used to formulate hypotheses about attention, fatigue, emotions, or vulnerabilities. Many consumer devices are not medical devices, so they do not fall under the strict regime governing health data. Some jurisdictions have already begun to regulate this area, such as Chile at the constitutional level and Colorado by including neural data among sensitive data. In Romania, we still have no specific regulation. If we delay, the market will organize itself before the law does. Once an economic model becomes established, it is very difficult to restrict it. The real risk is that we will come to consider it normal for an employer, an insurer, or a platform to evaluate what is happening in our minds. Mental space, which has always been the last refuge of freedom, would become an exploitable resource.
- If you were to conduct an ethical audit of an AI or longevity company today, what would be the first three uncomfortable questions you would ask its leadership?
The first question would be: What are you learning about people from their data, and who has access to this information? The second question would be: How can someone opt out? Consent has real value only if a person can withdraw without incurring a disproportionate cost. An implant, a platform, or a longevity protocol that you can no longer safely exit turns initial consent into a mere formality. The third question would be: Who pays when things do not go as promised?
- You’ve written about responsibility toward human non-presence or non-human presence. How does that translate for an ordinary person interacting daily with an AI assistant? What real moral responsibility do they carry, if any?
I started from Hans Jonas, who emphasized that our actions should be compatible with the continuation of authentically human life on Earth. I extended this idea to those who are not present when we make decisions: future generations, nature, and possible forms of non-human consciousness. For an ordinary person, this responsibility is more concrete than it might seem. Someone who uses an AI assistant remains responsible for the judgment they delegate. If they accept an answer without checking it, the responsibility remains theirs, not the system’s. They also have a responsibility toward other people whose data, photographs, or texts they enter into these systems without those people knowing.
There is another responsibility that we notice less often, namely the responsibility we have toward our own development. Daily interaction changes our thinking habits. If we gradually give up the effort to understand things for ourselves, we are making a choice, even if we do not perceive it as such. As for responsibility toward the system itself, I am cautious. I do not believe we currently have solid grounds for assigning it moral status. I do believe, however, that it is worth asking what kind of people we become through the way we relate to it.
Academic integrity, intellectual development and self-criticism
Here, the focus shifts from the technologies themselves to the intellectual responsibilities involved in studying them. The discussion addresses interdisciplinary research, the pressures of public debate, the distinction between conviction and dogma, and the evolution of theoretical positions as new contexts and evidence emerge.
- In your journey from pure academic research to becoming a public voice on such controversial topics as transhumanism, neurorights, and the ethics of augmentation, what has been the greatest personal or professional cost you have paid? How have you managed the tension between academic rigor and the pressure, or seduction, of being “on one side or the other” in the public debate?
The greatest cost came from choosing to work across disciplines. I have two doctorates, one in philosophy and one in law, while academia is still organized around separate fields.
As for the pressure to choose a side, I have tried to remain faithful to a rule that I consider essential in research. First, I present a position in its strongest possible form, and only then do I criticize it. I have never written about transhumanism either as a supporter or as an opponent. I recognize the aspirations behind it, but I also clearly identify the risks, especially those concerning inequality, autonomy, and the concentration of technological power. Public debate prefers unequivocal positions. I believe, however, that a researcher’s duty is to preserve nuance, even if it attracts less attention.
- Do you consciously examine your own patterns of thought, especially the moments where academic conviction might turn into dogma rather than a working hypothesis you’re still willing to test?
I have a few habits that help me do this. I often work collaboratively, and dialogue with other researchers forces me to lay out my arguments and defend them against genuine objections. I also use analytical tools that are not my own, such as the principles of bioethics formulated by Beauchamp and Childress or the ethical matrix I have applied. These tools compel me to take all the parties involved into account, rather than focusing only on arguments that confirm my intuition. The third thing is time. I return to my older texts and try to read them as if someone else had written them. If I can no longer defend a statement using the same arguments, that means it needs to be revised.
For me, the sign that a conviction has become dogma is simple: I can no longer formulate the strongest objection against it. As long as I can formulate that objection and take it seriously, the conviction remains a working hypothesis.
- Is there a belief or theoretical position you once held, about transhumanism, ethics, or law, that you later recognized as incomplete or distorted by context?
The clearest example is the central idea of my doctoral thesis. There, the emphasis was on the continuity between humanism and transhumanism, with transhumanism defined as a form of neo-humanism. However, the emphasis on continuity pushed the quasi-religious dimension of transhumanism and the possibility that its promises could be turned into commercial products into the background. The context at the time was predominantly philosophical, and the economic exploitation of these promises was not as visible as it is today. My volume on myths, archetypes, and symbols in transhumanism was intended precisely to complete this picture.
A similar development concerns the theme of eternal life. In my early articles, it was treated primarily as an open philosophical question. Subsequent legal research brought out the legal and economic dimensions of this question as well: access to longevity technologies, control over them, and the distribution of the risks they entail. This is not a change of position, but an expansion of perspective.
Reproductive technology, parenthood and the changing family
This section examines how advances in reproductive technology challenge established legal and social understandings of parenthood and family. It considers the distinction between genetic, gestational, and intended parenthood, as well as the role of legal frameworks in protecting the interests and rights of everyone involved.
- Having also worked on surrogacy and family law, what concept of “family” do you think we will be forced to completely rethink in the next decade, as reproductive technology advances?
I believe we will have to rethink the concept of filiation, especially motherhood. For a long time, the law operated on the assumption that the mother was always known, because she was the woman who gave birth. Assisted human reproduction has disrupted this unity. Today, we can speak of a genetic mother, a gestational mother, and a social or intended mother. These can be three different people.
A few years ago, drawing on Zygmunt Bauman, I wrote about the transition of the family from a “solid” to a “liquid” form. My research on surrogacy confirmed this intuition and showed me just how far the law has fallen behind reality. The European Court of Human Rights has had to develop criteria, step by step, for recognizing family life in these situations, and the best interests of the child have become the main point of reference.
In Romania, we still have no specific law on assisted human reproduction and surrogacy. This legal vacuum protects no one: neither the child, nor the woman carrying the pregnancy, nor the intended parents. We will have to decide what we base filiation on: the biological connection, the intention to become a parent, or the actual assumption of responsibility for caring for the child. I do not think we can postpone this decision much longer.
Persuasion, human identity and the limits of enhancement
This section explores the psychological mechanisms behind technological and ideological promises, alongside deeper questions about personal identity and human nature. It considers the relationship between enhancement, embodiment, vulnerability, psychological continuity, and the possibility that technological optimization may affect the very qualities it seeks to improve.
- What are the most effective forms of manipulation or ideological seduction you’ve observed, whether in extremist rhetoric, transhumanist promises, or public discourse about AI, and how can people be better equipped to recognize them? How does modern transhumanist discourse use the same psychological and rhetorical mechanisms as extremist ideologies or wellness marketing, particularly through hope, fear of missing out, and the language of “inevitability”, to bypass critical thinking?
The most effective form of seduction is not a lie, but a promise. Extremist ideologies, radical transhumanist discourse, and wellness marketing all begin with genuine suffering: illness, aging, insecurity, and the fear of not mattering are real. Manipulation begins when someone tells you that there is only one path to salvation and that they possess it.
I observe several recurring mechanisms. The first is the promise of a longer life. The promise is placed in a future close enough to motivate you, but distant enough that it cannot be disproven. The second is the fear of being left behind: anyone who does not adopt the technology or join the movement is portrayed as obsolete. The third is the language of inevitability: if the future has already been decided, there is no longer any point in discussing its direction, only how to adapt to it. This language is not new. Totalitarian regimes also claimed to be following the necessary laws of history. Today, that necessity is attributed to technology. To protect ourselves, we can ask a few simple questions. Who benefits if I believe this? What evidence exists today? What happens to those who choose something else? A discourse that accepts no alternative is no longer describing reality; it is trying to impose it.
- If you could give one piece of advice to young people entering a world shaped by enhancement technologies and algorithmic decision-making, what would it be?
I would tell them never to give up being the authors of their own judgment. They can use any tool, provided they understand why they are using it and can explain, in their own words, the conclusion they have reached. Performance can be augmented. The meaning of life cannot be delegated.
- Looking at your entire path as a researcher moving between philosophy, law, and bioethics, how has your own sense of self evolved across such different intellectual roles, and what had to be integrated, sacrificed, or strengthened to remain coherent?
My coherence did not come from belonging to a single discipline, but from a question I have continually returned to. From my first articles on the evolution of the human species to my research on neurorights, I have been interested in the same thing: what happens to the human person when technology changes their limits. Philosophy gave me the freedom to ask this question without rushing toward an answer. Law forced me to make it concrete. It taught me to ask who holds a right, who can violate it, and what remedy is available. I have tried to bring legal rigor into philosophical reflection and philosophical openness into legal analysis.
I gave up the comfort of belonging to a single academic community and, at times, the pace of a predictable career. In return, I became convinced that bioethics is not a marginal field, but the place where philosophy and law are compelled to engage in dialogue.
Looking back, my professional identity has been built in layers. The roles have not replaced one another; they have accumulated.
- How do you see the relationship between the “distributed layered Self”, grounded in body, relationships, culture, memory, prediction, and time, and transhumanist promises of externalization, mind-uploading, or radical enhancement? Is there a risk of losing precisely what makes us human in this process?
The idea of uploading the mind onto another, digital medium starts from a questionable premise: that the self is merely a pattern of information that can be copied. I see the self as a distributed and layered reality. It exists in the body that feels, in the relationships through which we are recognized, in the culture that gives us language, in the memory that ensures our continuity, in our ability to anticipate, and in the fact that we live within a limited span of time.
If we look at the self in this way, then uploading or digitizing the mind would, at most, transfer part of one of these layers. The body, relationships, and, above all, our relationship with our own finitude would be left behind. An interesting entity might emerge, but I am not convinced it would be the same person. The risk is not limited to spectacular scenarios. We are already externalizing our memory into phones, our sense of direction into navigation apps, and part of our judgment into recommendation systems. Each step seems harmless. Together, however, they can weaken the layers that ensure our psychological continuity. That is why I believe the right to psychological continuity addresses a very real vulnerability.
- How do we define “the human” at the exact moment we begin structurally modifying the mind, the body, and identity itself?
I do not believe we can define the human being through a list of biological traits, because such a list would become outdated with the first major technological intervention. I have always found another approach more fruitful. In my doctoral thesis, I used the idea of the Kashmiri philosopher Abhinavagupta concerning the five limitations of the human being: time, limited knowledge, the lack of plenitude, causality, and limited creative power. This perspective does not define the human being by what they have, but by how they relate to what they lack. The human being is a creature that knows its own limitations and constructs meaning in relation to them. Technology can shift these limits. But if it were to eliminate them all, the condition of a being that seeks meaning would also change. As a lawyer, my answer is simpler: human dignity does not depend on biological configuration. An augmented person remains entitled to the same rights. The law protects the person, not a particular type of body.
- Many transhumanist proposals optimize for performance and longevity. How do we make sure we’re not sacrificing the capacity to feel deeply, to build authentic relationships, and to find meaning within human limitation?
First of all, we must not reduce human well-being to what can be measured. Performance and longevity have clear indicators. The depth of an emotion or the authenticity of a relationship do not. There is always a temptation to regard as secondary whatever cannot be quantified. Secondly, I believe in the ethics of care. I have written that vulnerability is not merely a flaw to be corrected, but also the condition that allows us to care for one another. A completely invulnerable being would no longer need others and, perhaps, would no longer understand them either. Thirdly, we need evaluation before adoption. Alongside questions about safety and effectiveness, we should ask how a technology affects relationships, attention, and the way we relate to our own finitude.
- Given the psychological costs already visible from current technology, cognitive exhaustion, anxiety, fragmented attention, do you think accelerating augmentation will resolve these problems or amplify them?
I believe it will amplify them if the current economic model remains unchanged. Many of these costs do not come from technology itself, but from platforms designed to capture our attention and turn it into profit. In such an environment, cognitive augmentation would not free us from pressure. It would merely make us more capable of enduring it.
Another aspect concerns me as well: augmentation is often presented as a solution to exhaustion. If you can no longer cope, improve yourself. In this way, a structural problem becomes an individual failing. I see this as one of the forms of the “soft slavery” I mentioned earlier. I do not deny that some technologies can have genuine therapeutic effects. However, they will only help if accompanied by regulation and serious reflection on the pace we impose on our lives.
Governance, social justice and the future of human augmentation
The discussion now moves from individual experience and philosophical questions to the broader institutional and societal conditions surrounding human enhancement. It addresses the role of ethics in technological governance, the need for safeguards, the distribution of benefits and risks, and the preparedness of societies to manage increasingly consequential forms of augmentation.
- What role should ethics and philosophy play in governing technologies capable of altering human identity? Should there be moratoriums or protected zones exempt from this kind of intervention?
Ethics should not be invited to the discussion table only after a technology has been launched. I have used the term technoethics to describe an evaluation that takes place before adoption. Tools such as the ethical matrix allow us to identify, as early as the design stage, who is affected and which values are at stake. I also believe we need protected zones. We already have an important precedent: the Oviedo Convention, ratified by Romania, prohibits interventions aimed at modifying the genome of descendants. This prohibition must be maintained for as long as we cannot assess the effects on future generations, who are unable to give their consent.
As protected zones, I would consider childhood, education, judicial proceedings, and employment relationships. The power imbalance in these areas is significant, and consent is fragile. In my opinion, neuronal monitoring of pupils or employees should be prohibited, not merely made subject to conditions.
- If you were contributing to a national strategy on human augmentation, what would be the three non-negotiable principles?
The first principle would be the primacy of human dignity and mental integrity. No intervention in a person’s mental space can be justified solely on the basis of economic or security benefits in the absence of free and informed consent. The second would be distributive justice. Access to therapeutic technologies must be equitable, and the difference between augmented and non-augmented people must not become grounds for discrimination. The third would be precaution, together with responsibility toward future generations. Irreversible interventions, as well as those that can be passed on to descendants, must be subject to the strictest legal regime. Reversibility should be an explicit evaluation criterion.
- How do we assess the risk that selective augmentation creates a new social stratification, between the “augmented” and the “natural”, and what responsibility do we bear for that possible divide?
The risk is real. It has been pointed out by very different critics of transhumanism, from Francis Fukuyama to Michael Hauskeller. Today’s social inequalities are acquired and can, at least in principle, be corrected. An inequality inscribed in biology would be much harder to correct and could be passed down from one generation to the next. To assess this risk, we need to monitor who gains access to these technologies first, who finances them, and what advantages they offer. If augmentation becomes a condition for obtaining a job or a place at a good school, freedom of choice becomes a form of coercion. Our responsibility has two sides. Legally, we should include biological or technological status among the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited. Ethically, we must not treat the non-augmented person as an inferior version of the human being. I would not want us to reach a point where “natural” means “left behind”.
- Do you think Romanian society, given its specific traumas and pace of modernization, is ready for the more radical forms of transhumanism, or should we first prioritize basic resilience?
Romanian society has already experienced a project aimed at radically transforming the human being: the New Man of the communist regime. This experience can work in two directions. On the one hand, it can make us more suspicious of promises of total transformation, which I consider healthy. On the other hand, it has left behind a profound distrust of institutions, which makes regulation more difficult. I do not believe we have to choose between transhumanism and resilience. These technologies will reach us regardless. The question is whether we will meet them with an appropriate legal and cultural framework. For now, we have significant gaps: we have no law on assisted human reproduction, no regulation of neural data, and public debate on these issues remains limited. For me, resilience means education in critical thinking, institutions capable of evaluating complex technologies, and a healthcare system that ensures access to therapies that already exist. Without these, radical forms of augmentation would deepen inequalities rather than reduce them.
Transhumanism, immortality and the meaning of human existence
The final section considers the larger promises associated with transhumanism, particularly the pursuit of immortality and the overcoming of human limitations. It distinguishes philosophical aspirations from their commercial exploitation and examines the relationship between technological possibility, existential meaning, and the responsibilities of intellectual inquiry.
- In your view, what is the greatest illusion of current transhumanist discourse, and what is its greatest unexplored promise?
The greatest illusion is the belief that existential questions can receive technical answers. I have written about what I called the “euthanization of death”, meaning the desire to remove death from the human condition. Even if we lived much longer, the question of the meaning of life would not disappear. It would simply last longer. Technology can postpone death, but it cannot tell us why life is worth living. The least explored promise, paradoxically, lies in the quieter area of therapy and restoration. I am referring to the restoration of lost functions, a better understanding of consciousness, and the reduction of avoidable suffering. Public attention is focused on the Übermensch and immortality, even though the real and immediate benefits concern vulnerable people. I also see an ethical promise: transhumanism compels us to think about responsibility over a longer time horizon, one that includes future generations.
- In the context where transhumanism and big tech companies promise immortality and the Übermensch, do you believe we are actually witnessing the most sophisticated form of existential scam of the 21st century, a new secular religion that sells the illusion of absolute control over death and human limitations?
Many transhumanist thinkers sincerely believe in what they advocate, and some of their questions are philosophically legitimate. I would distinguish between transhumanism as a philosophical orientation and the commercial exploitation of its promises.
I am more inclined to agree with the second part of the question. I have argued that transhumanism functions as a secular quasi-religion. It has founding myths and symbols, such as H+; it has an eschatology, namely the singularity; and it has a promise of salvation, namely digital or biological immortality. What it lacks, however, is something that traditional religions have preserved: an awareness of limits and the idea that human beings are not the absolute masters of their own condition. The greatest risk is not belief itself, but the transformation of hope into a commodity. When immortality is sold as a subscription, a protocol, or an investment, the illusion of control becomes a source of profit. The role of intellectuals is not to reject these technologies, but to give them a cultural and ethical dimension and to clearly point out when a philosophical question has become a marketing strategy.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the questions raised throughout this interview point to a tension at the heart of transhumanism: our enduring desire to overcome human limitations and the need to understand what those limitations mean for our identity, freedom, and place in the world. Transhumanism is often presented as a project of technological progress, but it is equally a project of storytelling, one that inherits older myths of perfection, transcendence, control, and human exceptionalism. Recognising these foundations matters because the narratives through which we interpret technological change can shape not only what we consider possible, but also what we come to regard as desirable or inevitable.
The implications extend well beyond enhancement itself. They concern the protection of mental privacy and cognitive freedom in an age of increasingly intimate technologies; the distribution of responsibility between individuals, institutions, and intelligent systems; and the preservation of intellectual autonomy in environments where AI can both expand and potentially weaken our capacity to think. They also invite us to reconsider deeply established ideas about reproduction, parenthood, family, persuasion, and human identity as technological intervention begins to challenge distinctions that once appeared relatively stable. These developments cannot be evaluated solely through the language of innovation or individual choice. Questions of access, inequality, governance, and social justice are inseparable from the question of who benefits from enhancement, who bears its risks, and who has the authority to define its limits.
I do not see technological progress as inherently liberating or threatening, just as I do not believe that every human limitation is necessarily a defect waiting to be corrected. The possibility of extending life, augmenting cognition, or transforming our biological condition forces us to confront an even more fundamental question: whether overcoming a limitation necessarily brings us closer to a better form of existence. Longevity is not automatically meaningful, intelligence is not synonymous with wisdom, and greater control over our biology does not guarantee greater freedom. Nor should the prospect of radical transformation make us overlook the social, psychological, and ethical conditions that give human life its meaning.
The challenge, therefore, is not to defend humanity against change or to embrace every technological possibility in the name of progress. It is to approach transformation with intellectual humility, ethical responsibility, and a willingness to question the narratives that accompany it. We should be able to distinguish between what can be done and what is worth doing, between genuine emancipation and new forms of dependency, and between expanding human possibilities and redefining the human being according to the interests of those who control the technology. Perhaps the most important question is not whether we will transcend our present condition, but whether, in attempting to do so, we will retain the capacity to decide what kind of future is worth creating, and what, in that future, deserves to remain human.