How corporations and states designed a world in which isolation is mistaken for freedom
There is something odd about the way we live now. Most of us feel, without quite knowing how to name it, that daily life is shaped less by laws and more by rules that nobody voted on: terms and conditions ticked out of reflex, algorithms that decide what we see, subscriptions we can no longer do without, platforms with no alternative. At the same time, we live more alone than ever. Single-person households are growing in every region of the world: they make up about a third of households in the European Union, close to 40% in Seoul, and in some European capitals, such as Berlin, Paris or Oslo, more than half.

These two phenomena seem to belong to different registers, one political, the other intimate. This article argues that they are two faces of the same transformation. On one side, the large corporations have acquired a power that increasingly resembles sovereignty. On the other, they have learned to profit from a society broken into isolated individuals, and in many cases they have helped to break it. And, perhaps surprisingly, the conclusion is not that “the corporations have won,” but that the problem is one of public law: who writes the rules that bind everyone, and for whose benefit.
We will follow the thread in order: from the economic and infrastructural power of private giants to the gradual privatization of physical force; from the history of how individualism was marketed to the algorithms that monetize loneliness; from what happens inside families and couples to what states are doing about it; and finally to what can concretely be done, by an individual, by a community, and by a legal system that wants to recover its function.
Power without a mandate and unprecedented financial superiority
The concept of corporatocracy starts from a verifiable reality: multibillion-dollar conglomerates now hold more wealth, more resources and more infrastructure than many sovereign states. The market value of companies such as Apple, or the assets managed by firms such as BlackRock, routinely exceed the gross domestic product of developed G7 or European nations. Comparing stock-market capitalization with GDP is not methodologically perfect, but the order of magnitude says what matters: an asymmetry of power with no democratic counterpart. It amounts, in essence, to a redistribution of influence from elected states to boards of directors that nobody elected.
Mobility compounds the advantage. A multinational corporation can move its headquarters, supply chains or profits wherever the rules are more forgiving, and governments end up competing for its presence by offering deregulation and generous tax arrangements. The result is the familiar “race to the bottom”: states can no longer easily impose fiscal or environmental policy without risking an exodus of capital. Economic sovereignty becomes a negotiable fiction.
Critical infrastructure in private hands
The second lever is dependence. Governments rely more and more on private companies for essential services, and dependence translates into bargaining power. Modern states turn to Amazon Web Services for intelligence servers, to SpaceX’s Starlink for satellite communications during conflicts, and to specialized artificial-intelligence firms for military prediction software.
Just as important is control over the digital public square. Through algorithms, data accumulation and communication platforms, a tiny number of executives can alter democratic norms and sway public opinion on a planetary scale. When critical infrastructure is private, the state loses its monopoly over the instruments of governing, and national security becomes a rented service.
Law written by those it is meant to regulate
The third lever is political. Corporations have systematically embedded themselves in the legislative process, a phenomenon known as regulatory capture. In the United States, a decades-long political and legal trajectory arrived at the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United (2010). Its symbolic starting point is the confidential memorandum written in August 1971 by the lawyer Lewis Powell for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which urged the business community to organize politically. In 1978, by then a Supreme Court justice, Powell wrote the majority opinion in the Bellotti case, which protected corporate political speech. Citizens United then allowed corporations unlimited independent expenditures in campaigns, though not unlimited direct contributions to candidates. Historians disagree about how much weight the memorandum itself carried. Federal lobbying spending reached about $4.4 billion in 2024, a nominal record (a figure that also includes professional associations and unions, not only companies), and critics argue that legislation on taxation, the environment and labor is often rewritten in favor of profit rather than the public interest. In the harsh formulation of critics, law is no longer written by elected representatives but by corporate legal teams, and politicians remain ceremonial ratifiers.
Daily life, governed outside the ballot box
For most people, what dictates their everyday existence is corporate policy far more than government decree. Inside a company there is no democracy: decisions are taken top-down by a small group of executives and majority shareholders, and the employee depends on them for income, health insurance and, in practice, for a whole livelihood. Corporations have, moreover, become social institutions: they shape cultural values, influence which news is promoted and even educational systems, preparing children first of all to be efficient workers.
None of this is entirely new. The East India Company had its own armies and governed vast territories. The difference is that today private power operates inside formally intact states, with elections, parliaments and constitutions.
The state that can no longer enforce the law
In Max Weber’s sociology, the essence of sovereignty is the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. A law the state cannot enforce becomes an empty threat. And corporations undermine enforcement capacity in three ways.
The asymmetry of expertise
Regulatory agencies, from the SEC to the EPA, are chronically underfunded and understaffed relative to the industries they oversee. The best specialists in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and financial engineering work for the tech giants and for Wall Street, not for public authorities. When a state tries to impose algorithmic transparency or complex tax rules, it faces an army of lawyers and engineers who are years ahead of its investigators.
The outsourcing of enforcement tools
To enforce its laws, a government buys its tools from the very parties it is supposed to police: tracking software for the police, border surveillance, national-security instruments. If a government tried to hold to account a conglomerate on which its cloud services, telecommunications or military logistics depend, that conglomerate holds a genuine “kill switch.” The mere threat of withdrawing services can paralyze the state before its action begins.
Economic blackmail
Enforcement requires political will, and that vanishes when a corporation can shake an economy. Under too much fiscal or labor pressure, capital, intellectual property and factories can leave for a more accommodating country. And when large financial institutions or platforms break the law, states often avoid the harshest sanctions for fear of mass unemployment or collapse: the state becomes dependent on the survival of the one who broke the rules.
The gradual privatization of violence
If physical coercion also passes into corporate hands, sovereignty effectively moves from states to shareholders. Not through a military coup, but through outsourcing, technological monopolies and geographic insulation, with enforcement of force becoming a subscription service. The global market for private security services is estimated by market-research firms at roughly $260–275 billion in 2025, a figure that also includes building guards, alarms and cash-in-transit, not just military contractors; it operates alongside state forces. Four examples show how the drift occurs.
Private military contractors
When states lack the political will or the personnel to field their own armies, they hire corporate ones, which normalizes the idea that fighting and physical enforcement are purely commercial services. In fiscal year 2024 the U.S. Department of Defense obligated about $445 billion on contracts with private firms, 54% of it for services; the figure includes arms manufacturers, not only security contractors. Firms such as Constellis, which absorbed Blackwater/Academi, or DynCorp (since taken over by Amentum) manage logistics, training, border control and targeted operations. Being companies, they escape the public transparency, democratic vote and parliamentary oversight that govern traditional armies.
Special economic zones
In certain regions, states have legally given up the monopoly of force in favor of corporate entities within defined borders. In free zones and special economic zones in the Global South or in logistics hubs, corporations frequently employ large, heavily armed private security forces, such as G4S or Allied Universal, to guard mining assets, control the local population and suppress labor protests. If a worker protests or can no longer meet a contractual obligation, the one who detains or removes him is not the local police but a security agent acting on a corporate mandate.
The digital panopticon
Coercion does not always require a soldier with a rifle: it often begins with automated policing, biometric surveillance and algorithmic tracking outsourced to tech firms. Law-enforcement agents around the world rely on private data-analytics platforms such as Palantir Technologies for predictive-policing models and for managing immigration-monitoring networks. The physical act of detention stays with the state, but the “brain” that decides who will be targeted for coercion belongs to a corporation.
Private prisons
When states lack the money or administrative capacity to enforce criminal law, they hand the physical custody of people to the private sector. The private-prison industry, dominated by companies such as CoreCivic and The GEO Group, earns directly from holding offenders and undocumented immigrants. The gravest power of the state, the right to lock up a citizen, becomes a profit-generating mechanism for shareholders who, critics argue, lobby for harsher sentences precisely in order to keep cells full.
The tipping point is easy to describe. If a citizen’s neighborhood is patrolled by a private firm, his data are monitored by an analytics company in Silicon Valley, and the local economy is secured by a private military contractor, the state’s monopoly of force exists only on paper. Whoever pays the guard’s salary is the one who commands physical power.
How likely is a “takeover”
An exact mathematical probability cannot be given; a “takeover” will not look like a coup d’état but like a slow, uneven process that is already under way. With that caveat, no source supports precise figures; what remains are two qualitative judgments, framed as analytical opinion rather than measurement.
A formal takeover is unlikely. It is hard to imagine Apple, Amazon or a private military company dissolving governments, drafting a corporate constitution or replacing the UN. States are useful to corporations precisely because they bear the expensive burdens of roads, public health and the blame for social failures.
A functional takeover, by contrast, is considered by analysts very possible: a de facto control in which governments remain administrative shells that endorse corporate decisions and run basic services. In many sectors, from data and finance to logistics and military infrastructure, this is already the operational reality.
Let us hold on to this distinction, because it will be refined later: it may not be the most accurate formulation of the risk.
How isolation was sold as freedom
Power is not sustained by infrastructure and lobbying alone. It is also sustained by culture: by the diffuse conviction that it is normal, even desirable, to be alone. The history of that conviction has four acts.
The 1920s: inventing the consumer identity
Until the 1920s, goods were sold mainly on utility: you bought a coat because it was durable and kept you warm. Edward Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s nephew and the father of modern public relations, overturned that logic by applying psychoanalysis to mass marketing. His insight was that by tying products to unconscious desires and self-image, you can make people buy what they do not need.
His 1929 campaign for the American Tobacco Company, meant to break the taboo on women smoking, was emblematic. Cigarettes were no longer sold as a product but as “Torches of Freedom,” a radical gesture of individual emancipation. The lesson delivered to the public was profound: your identity is not given by the community you belong to, but by the products you choose.
The 1950s: suburbia and the end of mutual aid
After the Second World War, economic and political elites had a problem: how to turn a wartime economy into a peacetime growth engine. The answer was the systematic selling of the suburban American Dream. Working-class communities in dense cities had historically relied on shared infrastructure, neighborhood associations and mutual aid. Suburbia was, in large part, designed to fragment those collective networks.
Real-estate developers, carmakers and appliance manufacturers promoted happiness as a private nuclear unit enclosed behind a fence. Instead of a neighborhood sharing a laundry room or a park, every house needed its own washing machine, its own lawn mower, its own car. The slogan of the era, “keeping up with the Joneses,” turned neighbors from partners into rivals in a contest of conspicuous consumption. Daily life was commodified, and survival was privatized.
The 1970s–1980s: neoliberalism and “there is no such thing as society”
At the end of the twentieth century, the marketing of individualism migrated from lifestyle magazines directly into state ideology and economic policy, with economists such as Milton Friedman in the foreground. Business-funded think tanks and politicians attacked the very idea of public goods, from education to health and social protection. The message was packaged in the language of “personal freedom,” “personal responsibility” and the “self-made man.”
The symbolic peak was British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 1987 statement that there is no such thing as society, only individual men and women, and families. The practical result was the reframing of systemic problems as personal moral failures: if you were poor, sick or unemployed, it was no sign that something was wrong with the system, but proof of a lack of grit, work or good choices.
From the 2010s: the algorithmic “personal brand”
The latest stage came with Silicon Valley, smartphones and the attention economy. Social platforms took the corporate desire for an atomized workforce and automated it. Algorithms were designed to maximize engagement, delivering to each user a hyper-personalized, isolated reality tailored to his biases and anxieties.
And the technology sold the concept of the “personal brand” and the “influencer”: people were taught to see themselves not as citizens or members of a community but as small corporations. Hobbies, relationships and political opinions become material to be packaged, monetized and broadcast for visibility. When everyone is an independent creator competing for attention, systemic solidarity becomes structurally impossible.
The semantic inversion of the word “freedom”
We can sum up this whole history as a conceptual shift. To make isolation attractive, the word “freedom” was redefined: from positive freedom, the collective power to control one’s destiny, to negative freedom, the absence of friction, interference and dependence on others. The inversion rested on three cultural illusions.
The myth of the “sovereign individual.”
Dependence on other people was presented as weakness, and dependence on corporate infrastructure as liberation. Relationships are complicated, demanding compromise, emotional work and accountability; commercial messaging reframed communal obligations, from helping a neighbor to taking part in the local council or compromising with a partner, as “limitations” and “baggage.” The practical effect: once cut off from natural networks of support, a person keeps his needs but must buy the solutions. No neighbors to watch your house? Buy an alarm system. No community to cook with? Order through an app. Absolute isolation was successfully sold as “total independence.”
Equating choice with freedom
The public-relations machine tied freedom to the act of buying: you are free because you have fifty brands of cereal, hundreds of streaming services and thousands of products deliverable overnight. It is a superficial freedom, confined within the limits of the market: you are free to choose what to consume, but not to choose not to be a consumer. An infinite scroll of trivial choices fills the void left by isolation and keeps people too distracted to notice that their civic freedom has been hollowed out.
The war on friction
Silicon Valley promised a world without social friction: why go to a bank counter when you have an ATM, why talk to a cashier when you have self-checkout, why meet people in your neighborhood when you can swipe through a curated marketplace of faces? But small, low-stakes human interactions, a chat with the barista, a nod to a stranger on the bus, are the invisible glue of social trust and an antidote to loneliness. By labeling them “unnecessary friction,” tech companies systematically dismantled them, leaving individuals isolated in an automated, frictionless bubble.
The algorithm of loneliness
Digital platforms do not cause loneliness by accident; loneliness is the fuel of a business model built on attention and retention. A socially healthy person who spends his time with friends in a park or takes part in the life of a community center is, from the platform’s perspective, a weak customer: he generates no data and sees no ads. Algorithms therefore use sophisticated psychological loops that induce and exploit isolation.
The dopamine slot machine
Algorithms are built on the same principles as casino machines, namely variable rewards. When we post an image or an idea, the platform does not show it to our friends all at once; the “likes” are dripped out and the notifications timed to maximize anticipation and anxiety. A desperate craving for social validation is born. Because the connection is artificial and mediated by a screen, the dopamine dose is fleeting and leaves us feeling we have not really been seen, which sends us back to the “lever” of scrolling or posting. Emotional intimacy is replaced by a superficial network of mutual observation.
Social comparison and FOMO
To keep us scrolling, the algorithm must destabilize our self-esteem to some degree. Collaborative-filtering systems favor idealized, carefully curated portraits of success, because they provoke strong emotional reactions. Constant exposure to the “highlight reels” of thousands of strangers triggers upward social comparison and the fear of missing out (FOMO), and studies cited in the specialist literature link this curation to rising anxiety and social detachment. The cycle closes on itself: we return to the screen for relief from the very loneliness the screen has deepened.
The information cocoon
Algorithms put retention and emotional predictability above diversity. They serve us content that mirrors and amplifies our biases, fears and anxieties, building a hyper-personalized echo chamber. Over time these “cocoons” distort our perception: the world outside the screen seems hostile, alien and polarized, and the feeling that nobody in real life understands us pushes us deeper into digital isolation.
The AI-companion trap
The frontier of the loneliness economy is the monetization of synthetic relationships. Companies aggressively promote generative-AI companions and digital avatars designed as friends or romantic partners without friction. Because a chatbot is programmed not to contradict, not to quarrel and to be always available, it installs a toxic standard of intimacy: users begin to avoid the inevitable risk of human rejection and choose digital relationships. It is the ultimate dependence loop: the evolutionary need for human love is outsourced to a proprietary subscription controlled by a corporate server.
Family and couple under pressure
The marketing of individualism and the algorithmic exploitation of loneliness have also reshaped our closest bonds. Relationships have increasingly been seen through a market lens, intimacy has been commodified, the family has been atomized, and the couple has come to be treated as a fluid economic partnership.
The death of the relational safety net
The shift from multigenerational, community-based life to the isolated nuclear family, and now to the one-person household, has placed an impossible burden on families. Historically, raising children and caring for the elderly was a collective effort spread among relatives and neighbors. Hyper-individualism demanded that every nuclear family survive alone.
With networks of unpaid community support gone, every basic need has to be bought: care for children and the elderly, cooking and emotional support have been outsourced to corporate networks of day-care centers, private nursing homes and platform workers. And when a modern family struggles to balance work and home, the economic landscape frames it as a personal failure of organization or budgeting, driving a wedge of guilt and resentment between parents and children.
The consumer mindset applied to love
Dating apps, owned almost entirely by a few monopolies such as Match Group, have restructured the way people choose partners, turning encounter into a hyper-efficient digital marketplace. Algorithms treat human beings like products on an e-commerce shelf. The infinite scroll creates the illusion of unlimited choice and induces a psychological phenomenon called choice overload: people become paralyzed and chronically dissatisfied, always wondering whether a “better model” is one swipe away.
The relationship is increasingly assessed through cost–benefit analysis. Instead of being seen as someone with whom you build a life through mutual compromise, the partner becomes an object to optimize: does he fit my personal brand? Does she infringe on my freedom? Is this a good investment of my time?
Interdependence in the dock
The cultural narrative that you must be fully self-sufficient before you can love someone has armed individualism against the human biological need for dependence. Avoiding abusive relationships is crucial; but mass psychology, often amplified by algorithms, has swung to the opposite extreme, pathologizing normal and healthy interdependence as “clinginess” or a lack of boundaries. As a result, connections become disposable: phenomena such as ghosting, the abrupt cutting off of communication without explanation, are a direct product of a corporately formed mind that treats people as digital utilities rather than as complex social beings.
Together, yet miles apart
Even when families and couples sit in the same room, they are often physically together and digitally far apart. Algorithms actively compete with a spouse or a child for the dopamine receptors of the person holding the phone, and the result already has a name: phubbing, ignoring the person next to you in favor of a smartphone. Worse, a family or a couple once shared a relatively unified cultural landscape: the same news, the same local papers, the same neighborhood. Today, two people on the same couch can live in different cognitive universes, each fed a personalized stream that systematically estranges him from the person beside him.
“Therapy speak” turned into a weapon
Another, subtler mechanism is the way legitimate concepts from clinical psychology have been popularized, flattened and stripped of context by social media. The phenomenon is called therapy speak, and it turns tools of personal healing into clinical-sounding justifications for selfish behavior. Four expressions illustrate the drift.
“Setting boundaries.”
Real boundaries mean communicating what you will do to protect your peace. “Weaponized” boundaries are used to control others, through ultimatums such as “if you talk to your ex, you are violating my boundaries,” which frame the ordinary compromises of a relationship as psychological violations.
“Toxic.”
The word was meant to describe chronically abusive dynamics. Today it is applied to anyone who disagrees with us, holds us to account or is going through an emotionally difficult period. The label offers a quick, guilt-free exit, sparing us the arduous work of conversation and repair.
“Protecting my energy.”
The phrase becomes a shield against the basic obligations of reciprocity. A friend in crisis or a partner who wants to discuss a problem in the relationship is told “I don’t have the emotional capacity right now,” and ordinary emotional support is reframed as an unfair drain on personal resources.
“Emotional labor.”
The term was coined to describe workers who manage their feelings for a wage. Today it is applied to elementary human interaction: when listening to a partner or helping a relative resolve a conflict is seen as unpaid “labor,” relationships cease to be safe harbors and come to be treated as demanding, transactional jobs.
Through this clinical vocabulary, people can liquidate their relationships convinced they are doing something noble: practicing “self-care” and “healing.” The point is not to deny the value of psychotherapy or of healthy limits, but to notice how a language of healing can become an instrument of disconnection.
The numbers that explain everything
Corporations do not merely benefit from the breakup of families; they also have a clear economic interest. A single consumer is more profitable than a family unit, and the mechanics are simple.
The real-estate multiplier
When a family breaks up or a young adult chooses to live alone, demand for resources rises exponentially. A family of four in one house needs one refrigerator, one streaming subscription, one router, one set of kitchen appliances. If that unit splits into four households, corporations sell four times as many durable goods and utility subscriptions to the same number of people. Single-person households are growing in every region of the world: about a third of all households in the European Union and, according to some analyses, more than half in cities such as Berlin, Paris or Oslo — a clear commercial advantage for corporate landlords and developers.
The “singles tax”
Single consumers pay a hidden financial penalty, often called the singles tax, which goes straight into corporate margins. Food conglomerates and consumer-goods makers set prices to encourage bulk purchase, which favors families. Single people buy small, individually packaged portions that, by the gram, are significantly more expensive. In addition, someone who lives alone has no one to share household chores with and becomes a captive customer of the convenience economy: food delivery, outsourced laundry, ready-made meals on subscription. Traditional communal labor turns directly into corporate revenue.
The monetization of digital companionship
When real relationships dissolve, the human need for connection does not disappear; it is redirected to the market. Match Group (owner of Tinder, Hinge and Match.com) and Bumble generate billions of dollars a year, and their model depends in essence on users who stay single: a partner found means a lost customer. Premium tiers, profile boosts and read receipts are accordingly optimized to keep people swiping as long as possible. And, in parallel, AI companion apps offer, for a monthly subscription, a synthetic entity that asks how your day was: the elementary human act of listening is turned into a proprietary software-as-a-service model.
Two economies face to face
Set the two economies side by side and the contrast is stark. Where a shared or family economy offers intergenerational care as free communal support, the loneliness economy sells paid care for the elderly and for children, turning them into corporate profit centers. Where shared living costs mean one subscription and one set of goods for many, the loneliness economy multiplies consumer demand, because everyone buys his own. And where spontaneous connection once brought free emotional support from loved ones, it is replaced by commodified interaction: paid dating apps and AI companions.
The final loop
The system works as a self-feeding cycle. First, hyper-individualism uses therapy speak to convince us that severing ties is the supreme form of personal freedom. Then, once we are alone, it offers us corporate substitutes for the community we have just left.
The state as manager of decline
Two countries are pioneers of this crisis, because traditional family structures collapsed there earliest and fastest. They are trying to manage the macro effects through three strategies.
Institutions for loneliness and crisis centers
States have understood that loneliness is a massive burden on public health systems. In Seoul, single-person households make up close to 40% of the total (about 1.66 million in 2024, according to the city administration), against 36.6% across South Korea as a whole in 2025. The city created an office dedicated to care and loneliness policy and announced, in October 2024, a five-year plan of 451.3 billion won (about $320–330 million) called “Seoul Without Loneliness.” It includes the round-the-clock hotline “Goodbye Loneliness 120,” launched in April 2025, and “mind convenience stores” — community spaces where anyone can get a free bowl of ramen and talk to trained staff — all meant to bring isolated people proactively back into public life. Japan adopted a law on promoting measures against loneliness and isolation, in force since April 1, 2024, which created a national coordinating body, a priority plan and local councils. The context is harsh: in 2025 the national police recorded 76,941 people who died alone at home, roughly 30% of them discovered only after eight days or more, and more than three-quarters aged 65 or over — cases known in Japan as “lonely deaths” (kodokushi). The figure comes from police data and covers everyone found dead alone at home, not only those left undiscovered for a long time.
The “grief economy”
Loneliness has indirectly given birth to economic sectors that clean up after it. In Japan, firms specializing in cleaning homes after deaths that went unnoticed for weeks have become a distinct line of business.
“Synthetic socializing” Administrations increasingly fund institutionally created connection, although not all programs target loneliness directly. The Tokyo city government launched in September 2024 the AI-based matchmaking app “Tokyo Enmusubi” (an 11,000-yen registration fee, with documents proving income and marital status) and organizes dating events, but the stated goal is the birth rate. Japan has some 8,000 “dementia cafés,” supported from local budgets and covered by a national target that every municipality have one; they aim to prevent the isolation of patients and their families. And Seoul has promoted since 2012 a home-sharing program in which seniors offer rooms to young people at low rents, and the young help them in daily life.
Why did we “fall” into this trap?
People did not walk blindly into isolation; they fled into it as a survival strategy under predatory economic conditions. On one hand, in a world where property prices have outrun wages by hundreds of percent, young people can no longer afford a family home and children; staying single is often the only way to avoid poverty. On the other hand, honestly, traditional family and community structures also included trauma, stifling patriarchal norms and a lack of privacy. When corporations offered an escape — a small apartment, an individual income and an app for every need — it felt like liberation. People traded the inconvenient, demanding support of a community for the predictable quiet of an automated apartment. Later they learned that the end point of total independence is absolute isolation.
Why don’t states fight the phenomenon?
On paper, governments are alarmed by falling birth rates. In reality, states avoid combating the loneliness economy because they are structurally dependent on it. First, because of short-term GDP growth: four single households consume four times as many appliances, utilities, energy and space as one family; for a government obsessed with quarterly growth, the loneliness economy looks like a miracle, and fighting it would mean deliberately reducing demand. Second, because of corporate capture: the politicians who write the laws depend on the donations and lobbying of real-estate developers, delivery giants, tech monopolies and private health firms that earn billions from atomized consumers. The state will not bite the hand that feeds it.
How and why states “consolidate” the phenomenon
Instead of treating the cause — poverty and social alienation — states institutionalize and manage the loneliness economy to prevent total social collapse. They do so through “single-friendly” legal and fiscal measures: incentives for developers who build small homes suited to people living alone, and programs such as Seoul’s co-living housing, with private rooms rented up to 50% below market price on contracts of six to ten years. They also do so through algorithmic surveillance of vulnerability: governments integrate financial, welfare and utility data into predictive models to flag when a lone citizen has stopped paying the water bill or logging into the medical portal — not to change his life, but to deploy emergency counseling before he dies alone.
The underlying aim is what analysts call managed decay. The state knows it cannot afford to rebuild the traditional social safety net or to dismantle the corporate monopolies; its survival strategy is therefore to stabilize isolation. With just so many psychological hotlines, just so many micro-homes and just so much digital monitoring, the lone consumer stays functional enough to wake up, go to work, pay taxes and buy corporate goods until the day he dies. The state’s role has shifted from protector of society to logistics manager of an automated human warehouse owned by shareholders.
Not takeover but fusion
Up to here, the story seems simple: the corporations won, the state lost. But history suggests a more nuanced picture, and a more worrying one.
When states can no longer control private power, they are not, as a rule, replaced by groups or organized institutions. They tend to fuse with it, in an authoritarian regime. The conflict between the political class and the business class has historically been resolved not by subordinating one to the other but by absorbing the latter into the administration. This is the “corporate state” scenario: not corporate takeover but fusion.
Moreover, the corporate order does not, in the first instance, produce public law; it produces private law — contract, arbitration, terms and conditions. It does not want to govern in the strong sense but to extract. And the modern problem is not that firms have won sovereignty but that the state has handed over a great deal of it: through deregulation, outsourcing and trade agreements. The question shifts from “how do we resist corporations?” to “who signs the deregulations, and in whose favor?”
The risk is therefore not a takeover but a regime with formal democratic legitimacy and real private sovereignty. Pressure runs, in the end, in one of two directions: toward re-publicization (antitrust, public utilities, revoked charters) or toward authoritarian fusion. And historically, the excesses of private power were overcome not by resilient micro-communities but by rebuilding public law: antitrust, regulation of critical infrastructure, public procurement, campaign-finance reform, conditioning of charters.
We are, then, dealing with a crisis of public law: a fragmentation of sovereignty, a risk of oligarchic capture, and the real possibility of a shell state that administers decline until real power finds a form — either re-publicization or an authoritarian one. The basic mechanism is the overlay of private legal regimes (contract, terms and conditions, arbitration, lex mercatoria) on the territory of the state. It is power over persons, not only over territory. And it works as formal legal equality coupled with radical economic inequality, which makes domination invisible and, perversely, legitimate: “you accepted the terms.”
When the corporation produces public law
Let us push the logic one step further. If the corporate order also produces public law, we are no longer speaking of a “corporate state” as a fusion but of the state as notary of private legislation. Four things change.
The public/private distinction collapses
Public law binds everyone, on a territory, without consent; private law binds only the parties who “accepted the terms.” If a private rule becomes binding erga omnes but without democratic authorization, the opposition vanishes. Legitimation no longer runs through “you accepted” but through imposition — exactly the model of public law, but with the wrong author. The state is no longer even captured: it becomes the executor of a legislation it did not write.
The nature of power changes: from extraction to governing
We said that the corporate order does not want to govern but to extract. Producing public law overturns the idea: durable extraction needs public law. Contract is fragile, arbitration is costly, terms and conditions can be challenged. Regulation, binding standards and administrative sanctions are the technology of stability. A corporation that produces public law does not give up extraction; it institutionalizes it. The shift from “I extract” to “I legislate so that I can extract stably” is qualitative.
A regression in the history of law: from territorial to personal
Modern public law is territorial — sovereignty is exercised over a space. Corporate public law would be personal and functional: it governs users, employees, suppliers, “ecosystems.” It is a return to pre-modern personal jurisdiction — feudalism, medieval lex mercatoria, guild statutes. When the corporation produces public law, this shift becomes a legal regime, not just a side effect.
How private public law is produced, concretely
Not by coup, but through banal channels: delegation and co-regulation (the state gives normative power to private actors); incorporation by reference (the law points to technical standards written by firms — ISO, IEEE, security standards); the hardening of soft law (codes of conduct that become binding through regulation or through contract with the state); investment arbitration (ICSID and others), which produces rules with public effect; platform governance (“oversight board”-type bodies, rules applied to billions of subjects); public procurement and outsourcing, which transfer functions of authority. No single step looks spectacular; together, the legislative function is externalized.
The consequences
The first is a legitimacy deficit: public law without a public author. All that remains is the formal legitimacy of the state’s stamp — exactly “formal democratic legitimacy, real private sovereignty,” taken to the end. The second is that exit disappears: from a contract you can, in theory, withdraw; from public law you cannot. “You accepted the terms” is no longer even a fiction; the rule applies to you anyway. The third is the erosion of the rule of law: no separation of powers, no real administrative review and no right of appeal to a public authority. The fourth is that the legislative monopoly, the defining attribute of sovereignty, disappears, and the state becomes a shell state that ratifies. Finally, a hierarchical private legal pluralism is born: competing functional jurisdictions with their own justice (arbitration) and their own currency of sanction — access, account, reputation.
Three possible exits
The first is legal neo-feudalism: a plurality of private jurisdictions, with a weak state in the role of arbiter. The second is authoritarian fusion: the state formally takes over authority, but the content remains private — the “corporate state” in its complete form. The third is re-publicization: the recovery of the legislative monopoly and of the regulatory function.
If the corporate order ends up producing public law as well, the “corporate state” is no longer a fusion of two powers but a single power changing its legal clothing: it extracts as a private actor, it binds as a public one. The risk is no longer takeover, nor fusion, but the confiscation of the constituent function — who writes the rules that bind everyone.
Countermeasures at three scales
The countermeasure is neither purely communal nor exclusively jurisdictional. It combines resilient micro-communities with the rebuilding of public law: the jurisdictional instruments — antitrust, regulation of critical infrastructure, public procurement, campaign-finance reform, conditioning of charters — give communities the institutional framework for action; and communities give the law the social support without which it would remain formal.
The list of instruments must, moreover, be extended, because it is no longer a matter of defending only terrain but the legislative function. What is needed: the publicization of standard-setting (technical standards produced through transparent, contestable procedures with public participation); the state action doctrine (when a private actor exercises public functions, the obligations of public law apply to it — due process, non-discrimination, reasoned decisions); constitutional control of delegation (limits on how much normative power can be transferred); transparency and judicial review for arbitration with public effect; and conditioning charters and procurement on respect for public-law obligations.
What, then, is the smallest institutional step that recovers part of the legislative function without triggering authoritarian fusion? The possible answers, in order of feasibility, are: at the local level, municipal ordinances that ban predictive policing, make public procurement conditional on open standards and create public lobbying registers; at the national level, public-procurement reform, antitrust laws with “critical infrastructure” criteria, and constitutional control of delegation; at the European and international level, the publicization of standard-setting (ISO, IEEE), transparency of investment arbitration and conditioning of charters.
An individual alone cannot recover the legislative function. But the individual is the only unit that can begin three things that, together, matter.
Reducing your own dependence (necessary, but insufficient)
This is the level at which almost everyone stops, believing the problem is solved. It is not, but without it the rest does not work: a completely dependent individual has no time, energy or credibility to do anything else.
Concretely, what matters is sharing resources with 5–15 people: a library of tools and appliances (even just a messaging group or a shared spreadsheet, instead of everyone buying his own drill or pressure cooker), bulk purchases, shared subscriptions where legal. Not as moral virtue, but as a reduction of the “singles tax” and as an exercise in coordination. What matters is de-commodifying care: a childcare or pet-care cooperative, a “meal train” for those in crisis — not a delivery gift card when a friend loses a job or has a newborn, but food cooked and brought by hand — collective attention to the elderly in the network, so that they do not end up too soon in private facilities. You rotate favors with real people instead of paying for every emotional or logistical need.
What matters, next, is strategic friction: phones in a basket at Sunday dinner or game night, an “open door” policy (friends can drop by without an appointment — frictionless scheduling apps kill spontaneity), close groups moved from commercial platforms to privacy-focused ones such as Signal. And refusing to let therapy language become an excuse: you listen to a friend in distress without calling it “unpaid emotional labor,” you stay in the room for difficult conversations instead of labeling someone “toxic” and disappearing. What matters, finally, are non-commercial physical spaces: parks, libraries, community gardens, instead of cafes and malls, where your right to exist is tied to a card.
The limit of this register is clear: if you stop here, you have built a comfortable bubble that can be co-opted or ignored. A micro-community without a legal framework remains vulnerable.
Building collective capacity (the only thing that scales)
An individual has no leverage against a corporation. Ten organized people do. A hundred have political leverage. This is where the game is actually played.
The first rule: choose one durable structure and join it — a housing cooperative, an active homeowners’ association, a union, a care co-op, a local buying group. Not ten; one. Long-term commitment beats a week of enthusiasm. The second: get involved in the homeowners’ association or the local council, the most underrated level of real power. This is where mega-corporate warehouses are blocked, predictive policing is banned, public procurement is made conditional. The third: document and challenge — public-information requests, complaints to regulators, support for NGOs that litigate. Individual effort has disproportionate leverage here, because public institutions are underfunded and few people watch them.
The limit: organized communities without a legal framework can be divided, bought or exhausted.
From consumer to citizen (recovering public law)
This is the register almost nobody takes seriously, because it is slow, boring and gives no immediate satisfaction. What matters here is supporting antitrust, regulation of critical infrastructure and campaign-finance reform — not through slogans, but through voting, small donations and pressure on local candidates. What matters is demanding the publicization of standard-setting: technical standards (ISO, IEEE, security, interoperability) become binding through legislative reference, so their procedures must be transparent and contestable. What matters is supporting the state action doctrine, built through litigation, articles and debate, not through boycotts. What matters is making public procurement conditional on open standards and public-law obligations, which is feasible above all at the local level. And what matters is not confusing a boycott with politics: a boycott is exit; politics is voice. The corporate order thrives when citizens choose exit (isolation, alternative consumption) over the voice of regulation, litigation and legislative pressure.
What NOT to do
Do not confuse personal purity with political change: a person who lives perfectly sustainably and engages in nothing leaves the vacuum that lobbyists fill. Do not make “voting with your wallet” your main strategy — it is the weakest lever and the easiest to co-opt. Do not retreat into prepper-style isolation: isolation is exactly the product the system sells as freedom. Do not use therapy language as an excuse to avoid difficult conversations, responsibility or long-term commitment. And do not confuse criticism of the system with action: cynicism is a comfortable form of capitulation.
Why reforms fail, and how to win anyway
Reforms do not fail because their ideas are wrong, but because the private power they try to limit has the capacity to capture or destroy public institutions before they become effective. Six lessons follow.
Lesson 1: Reform works only when it hits three points at once. Antitrust alone solves nothing if critical infrastructure stays private and technical standards remain written by firms. Regulation of infrastructure alone is not enough if campaign finance stays unlimited. Campaign-finance reform alone is not enough if procurement keeps transferring functions of authority to private parties. The re-publicization agenda must be integrated: a package that links antitrust, public standard-setting, conditioned procurement and arbitration transparency has exponentially better odds than four separate initiatives.
Lesson 2: Private power yields only when the cost of resistance exceeds the cost of concession. Nothing is achieved by appeals to responsibility; it is achieved by raising the cost of the behavior. The levers are legal (fines proportional to global turnover, not profit; collective litigation; personal liability of directors), political (conditioning market access, revoking charters, exclusion from public procurement), reputational (sustained press, coordinated boycotts, documented disclosures) and economic (functional alternatives — public infrastructure, open standards, cooperatives that scale — that make resistance cheaper than concession). Every action must be thought of as an instrument for raising cost, not as moral expression.
Lesson 3: The failure of a reform does not mean the death of the idea, but a shift of the front. A law blocked at one level returns at another: local (ordinances, procurement, zoning), national (legislation, regulators, administrative courts), European (DMA, DSA, AI regulation, cross-border procurement), international (standard-setting, arbitration transparency), through litigation (national and European courts, state action) or through contract (conditions imposed through public procurement and partnerships). The question is not “did we lose?” but “at what next institutional level can the same demand be imposed?”
Lesson 4: Reform without a social base is formal; a social base without a legal framework is vulnerable. A cooperative that does not engage in local politics will be blocked by hostile regulation. An antitrust law without a social base to defend it will be hollowed out by amendments. An NGO that litigates without local communities to give it legitimacy will be isolated. Every micro-community needs a public-law agenda — a concrete legislative or administrative demand — and every public-law campaign needs real people who show up at hearings, write letters, vote.
Lesson 5: Reform is possible in crises, not in normal times. Windows open in crises — economic, of legitimacy (scandals exposing capture), geopolitical (critical infrastructure, digital sovereignty, supply chains), technological (AI, data, interoperability) — and close within 6–18 months. Whoever has the text ready when the crisis hits, with the coalition formed and the message clear, wins; whoever improvises loses.
Lesson 6: The enemy is not the company but the structure that makes capture legal and legitimate. Do not fight “big tech” or “the banks” as entities; fight the structure that lets them write binding standards without public procedure, arbitrate disputes with public effect in private tribunals, receive functions of authority through procurement without public-law conditions, finance campaigns without transparency, receive normative delegations without constitutional control and govern users through terms and conditions with erga omnes effect. “Break up Amazon” is a slogan. “Ban normative delegation to private actors without constitutional control” is a reform. The first mobilizes and fails; the second is boring and wins.
Six steps for an individual
Step 1: Choose a mechanism, not a company. Choose a single mechanism — technical standard-setting, public procurement, arbitration, charters, campaign finance, control of delegation — and become an expert in it. Depth beats breadth: someone who understands exactly how an ISO standard is written and how it gets into legislation has more leverage than a hundred people posting about “monopolies.” Start with 30 days of targeted reading — a report, a law, a procedure — and identify the exact point where the decision is made and who makes it.
Step 2: Join an existing structure; don’t build from scratch. A homeowners’ association, a litigation NGO, a cooperative, a union, a local buying group, a neighborhood organization: existing structures already have legitimacy, institutional access and memory, while building from scratch consumes 2–3 years and usually fails. Identify three active structures in your area, go to a meeting and ask: what is your biggest institutional frustration? The answer gives you the agenda.
Step 3: Bring a concrete public-law demand. Do not stop at “awareness.” Formulate a local ordinance, a condition in the specifications of a public procurement, a public-information request, a complaint to a regulatory authority: concrete demands produce verifiable results and create precedent, vague ones produce debates that fizzle. Choose a single measurable target within 90 days — for example, that the city council adopt an ordinance banning the purchase of predictive-policing software without a public impact assessment.
Step 4: Build the social base around the demand. Institutions respond to visible pressure: a demand backed by 30 people physically present weighs more than 3,000 online signatures. Identify 5–10 people in your structure who are directly affected, ask them to attend a single public meeting and prepare a two-minute statement for them.
Step 5: Prepare for the window. Write the text of the demand in advance — ordinance, amendment, procurement condition — form the coalition and draft the one-page message. When the crisis comes (a scandal, an accident, a conflict), the window is open for 6–18 months. Write now a two-page text, in legislative format, show it to a lawyer or a sympathetic civil servant, and refine it.
Step 6: Raise the cost; don’t ask for goodwill. Every action of yours — vote, lawsuit, information request, boycott, press, complaint to a regulator — must make corporate behavior more expensive. Companies do not give up power because it is right but when the cost of resistance exceeds the cost of concession. For every action, ask: what cost does this create, and for whom? If the answer is “none,” don’t do it.
The construction of hope
Why has the loneliness economy won? Not because people naturally want isolation, but because the entire economic, technological and cultural system is optimized to penalize interdependence and reward individualism. Four structural reasons intertwine.
The first is the maximal profitability of the isolated individual: for modern capitalism, a united community that shares resources is an “inefficiency,” because it buys less, and a community fragmented into four lone individuals means four times as many subscriptions, appliances, rents and deliveries. The second is the externalization of social costs by the state: without free community support, people are forced to work more to buy it, and free time disappears — and without time, deep relationships become impossible to build. The third is the attention economy: platforms want us alone in front of screens, and real human connection is unpredictable, demands effort and produces no data. The fourth is flight from the oppression of traditional communities: transactionality was welcomed as liberation, and people chose the predictable comfort of the transaction over the unpredictable mess of interdependence, without seeing that the final destination may be alienation.
The countermeasure is not a return to the past but the creation of a counter-infrastructure of solidarity — and, simultaneously, the rebuilding of the public law that gives this solidarity a framework. The simplest metric of resistance remains interdependence. Ask yourself: if my car breaks down, I fall ill or I lose my job tomorrow, is my first instinct to open an app and pay a corporation to fix it, or to call someone in my network? Moving your default answer from the app to the person next to you is how you survive the corporate drift.
Corporations thrive on hyper-individualism because isolated consumers are easy to manage, while organized communities are not. And an organized community that also knows its public instruments — antitrust, procurement, standards, arbitration, campaign finance — can do what no consumer, no corporation and no shell state can do alone: it can write the rules again. Every shared dinner, every borrowed tool, every difficult conversation held instead of a disappearance, every public meeting attended with a clear demand are small acts of sabotage against the engineering of loneliness. The first step is always the same: to look beyond the screen and talk to the person next to you. The second is to go, together with him, to where the rules are written.